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1  Introduction 
 
In recent years, the need to address and mitigate violence has gained currency in 
mainstream development thinking and practice. One and a half billion people, or more than a 
quarter of the world’s population, live in areas affected by fragility, conflict or large-scale, 
organised criminal violence (World Bank 2011). Violence is the leading cause of death 
among children worldwide and one of the leading causes of death among those aged 15–44, 
especially men, according to the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) 
(Krisch et al. 2015; WHO 2014). A considerable proportion of the world’s poor live in 
violence-affected areas and some estimate that by 2030, nearly two thirds of the global poor 
will be living in states exhibiting varying forms of fragility, including violence. Conflicts are 
often not one-off events, but rumble on in different forms over a long period of time: 90 per 
cent of civil wars in the period 2000–10 occurred in countries that had already had a civil war 
in the last 30 years (World Bank 2011). Unsurprisingly, countries emerging from war face a 
44 per cent chance of relapsing within five years (World Bank 2007). In some places, 
particularly areas affected by long-running civil war and other forms of chronic insecurity, 
violence has become a valid tool for national and community conversations. Improving 
physical safety and security rank among the most important ways in which people’s lives 
could be improved in many areas outside of traditional conflict settings. The Global Peace 
Index estimates that the economic impact of violence on the global economy in 2014 was 
around 13.4 per cent of world gross domestic product (GDP) and has increased by over     
15 per cent against 2008. 
 
Yet, while the need to reduce violence lends a new rationale for aid, and pushes a much 
needed rethink of the role, pursuit and practice of development in fragile contexts, the global 
setting for armed violence reduction is highly uncertain. Slowing economic growth in China is 
having ripple effects across the global economy, darkening development prospects in a 
number of countries that rely on commodity exports to Beijing, including many that are 
affected by violence. Although clearly important, the relationship of such changing global 
economic conditions to violence in different parts of the world is poorly understood; nor do 
the relationships run just one way. In Syria, internecine warfare drags into a sixth year, with 
no apparent end to a conflict that has left an estimated 250,000 dead and over 7.5 million 
displaced (IDMC 2015). Here, declining oil and other commodity receipts have constricted 
funding flows to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). As the case of Syria shows, 
many of today’s armed conflicts are internationalised. The migrant and refugee crisis 
engulfing European countries since 2014 is the largest humanitarian crisis of modern times, 
with over one million refugees and migrants arriving in Europe by sea in 2015 alone 
(UNHCR 2016). 
 
As public attitudes harden, and anti-immigrant populism spreads, Europe’s political leaders 
struggle to agree on an effective strategy or identify more imaginative responses to the mass 
movement. In Libya, fragmentation of political authority and a surge in violence has followed 
in the years since the 2011 multinational North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military 
operation to topple the former Gaddafi regime. In a fractured security landscape with multiple 
and overlapping combatants, ISIL has carved out a base in the port city of Sirte, prompting 
speculation of renewed international military involvement. Worsening violence is not only a 
problem in new flashpoints of North Africa and Syria. In places like South Sudan, Somalia 
and Burundi, new violence flares in old conflict systems, showing the persistence of conflict 
drivers and the significant challenges to establishing a durable peace and lasting reduction 




Globally, fatalities due to violence – in both conflict and non-conflict settings – fell from an 
estimated 526,000 people every year in 2004–07 to 508,000 in 2007–12 (Geneva 
Declaration 2015). Not only is the average rate of lethal violence diminishing, but levels of 
violence remain low or continue to decline in countries and territories where the incidence of 
violence has narrowed, as well. Yet, according to the Global Burden of Armed Violence 2015 
report, while fatalities due to violence overall continue to decline, conflict deaths surged by 
34 per cent between the periods 2004–07 and 2007–12, mostly due to the situations in Libya 
and Syria. Further, lethal violence continues to rise in some countries not experiencing 
armed conflict, including Honduras and Venezuela (Geneva Declaration 2015). Thus, while 
deadly violence has reduced in some places, conflict-related violence has spiked, including 
in a number of countries that were formerly stable, even while violence persists in other 
places that are chronically insecure. In addition, violent deaths are only the most visible 
outcome of violent behaviour, with even more people affected by disease and disability, and 
a host of other health and social consequences resulting from violence (WHO 2014). 
Violence is multidimensional and has substantial impacts on the safety and welfare of 
millions of people which spread well beyond violent deaths. 
 
The argument to focus aid resources on addressing and mitigating violence is that the 
occurrence and patterns of violent conflict relate to a number of drivers, situations and 
processes that concern development. For the first time ever, violence features explicitly in a 
global development framework: reducing violence is the first target of the United Nations 
(UN) Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 on peace, justice and strong institutions, 
recognition of the interrelationship between security and development. A consensus has 
emerged at high policy levels around the basic elements of an approach to reduce armed 
violence. These elements of a violence reduction paradigm include the following: 
 
1. The need to create legitimate institutions, often through efforts to craft political 
settlements; 
2. Strengthening access to justice and security systems; 
3. Extending economic opportunities and employment, especially for young people; 
4. Fostering societal resilience, both through institutions as well as by considering the 
sustainability of interventions. 
 
This paradigmatic approach to reducing violence is implicit in the SDGs and proposals to 
foster more inclusive and secure societies. Still, while there is broad agreement on what 
needs to be done to transform violent, unstable states and societies into conditions that are 
less violent, these are statements of long-term transformation. A limitation of the best 
practice paradigm is that its elements imply that violent places need to evolve to more 
resemble places that are already peaceful and stable. Yet, as argued below, conditions of 
comparatively greater peace, stability and security follow extended processes of conflict and 
change; they are not always evident outcomes of more funding, capacity building and 
international political attention. Leaving aside the fundamental point that violence exists 
because it is so often an effective way of doing development and making change happen, a 
significant obstacle facing development funders and planners who seek to reduce violence is 
the lack of rigorous evidence pointing to what needs to be done to reduce violence over the 
short and medium term. Violence is often the currency of politics, the bedrock of 
development writ large in places now in the most intractable situations, like South Sudan, 
Somalia and Syria. Given the embeddedness of violence in many political systems, and the 
longer-term transformations needed to move to more peaceful conditions, how can violence 
be addressed and mitigated in the near term? 
 
This Evidence Report details key insights from the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) 
Addressing and Mitigating Violence (AMV) programme, which involved detailed political 
analysis of dynamics of violence as well as efforts to reduce and prevent violent conflict 
across a number of countries and areas in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and South 
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Asia (see Box 1.1). In particular, the evidence highlighted here is from violent settings that 
do not neatly fit categories of ‘war’ or ‘peace’. The findings of these studies, published as a 
series of open-access reports, Policy Briefings and blogs, were discussed by conflict and 
security experts as well as thinkers from aid and advocacy organisations at a consultative 
session in London in November 2015. This report uses evidence from the programme to 
critically reflect on policy and programming policy approaches for reducing violence. 
Specifically, it provides a synthesis of findings around these themes: (1) the nature of 
violence and how it might be changing; (2) the connectivity of actors across levels and 
space; and (3) the significance of identities and vulnerabilities for understanding and 
responding to violence. The report concludes by examining the implications of the research 
for the violence reduction paradigm. 
 
Box 1.1  The IDS Addressing and Mitigating Violence (AMV) 
programme 
The IDS Addressing and Mitigating Violence (AMV) programme was a four-year programme of 
work funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID). Its genesis was the 
World Development Report 2011 on Conflict, Security and Development, as well as a longer 
pedigree of critical conflict analysis by IDS researchers. The programme sought to understand the 
causes and consequences of new, emerging forms of violence as well as longstanding conflicts 
across a number of settings exhibiting a variety of political and social violence, including Egypt, 
Nigeria, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, Madagascar, South Africa, India and Nepal. The case 
studies were clustered around three key themes: (1) strengthening core state functions and citizen 
capacities to mitigate and prevent violence; (2) improving access to livelihoods, jobs and basic 
services in violent contexts; and (3) reducing cross-border crime and conflict spillovers through 
strengthened bilateral and regional cooperation. All of the programme’s publications are free to 
download at: www.ids.ac.uk/idsresearch/addressing-and-mitigating-violence.  
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2  Global violence reduction and the search 
for good practice 
2.1  The turn to violence in global development thinking 
It has long been recognised that there has been a global shift away from ‘old’ inter-state or 
civil conflicts that characterised the pre-Cold War era towards ‘new’ types of war and conflict 
(Kaldor 2005, 2012, 2013). New forms of conflict are diffuse, characterised by episodic and 
recurring violence, and involve an assortment of state and non-state actors bound by 
transnational networks and flows (Duffield 2001; Eriksson and Wallensteen 2004). Most 
deaths due to violence now occur outside of traditional conflict settings (Krause, Gilgen and 
Muggah 2011). Many studies have shown the connectivity of different, seemingly separate 
types of violence, in which a chain of violence links violence observed in conflict with other 
structural and interpersonal violence (Annan and Brier 2010; Caprioli 2005; Luckham 2015). 
 
Reducing armed violence has emerged in its own right as a major area of development 
policy and programming over the past ten years. The Geneva Declaration on Armed 
Violence and Development was adopted at a Ministerial Summit in Geneva in 2006 and is 
now endorsed by over 100 states. It effectively lobbied for the inclusion of armed violence 
prevention and reduction within the UN system. The subsequent Geneva Platform, 
established in 2008 connects peace-building actors, resources and expertise, and publishes 
papers and briefs on this specific area of work. The UN Secretary General’s report on 
Promoting Development through the Reduction and Prevention of Armed Violence (United 
Nations General Assembly 2009) detailed the impacts of violence on development and 
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In May 2010, more than         
60 states endorsed the Oslo Commitments on Armed Violence, which agreed concrete 
measures to address armed violence (Oslo Commitments 2010). This commitment, and the 
2009 UN Secretary General report were closely followed by the 2011 World Development 
Report (WDR), which focused on addressing and mitigating violence (World Bank 2011). 
The G7+ New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (G7+ 2011) was endorsed shortly after 
the WDR release, in November 2011, arguing for member states to be more context-
sensitive and country-led in their approaches to development in fragile states. More recent 
attention has focused on the relationships between development and radicalisation, 
including the UN Secretary General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (United 
Nations General Assembly 2015), which seeks systematic preventive steps to address the 
underlying conditions that drive individuals to radicalise and join violent extremist groups. 
Other prominent development actors, such as the UN, Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), and the Department for International Development 
(DFID) have produced a multitude of reports and publications on the topic, ranging from 
annual OECD States of Fragility 2007–present (OECD 2015) reports to the UN Disarmament 
Occasional Paper series 1999–14 (UNODA 2014). 
 
However, even before the recent turn to violence, since the 1990s there has been a 
groundswell of thinking, funding and advocacy within development on preventing and 
responding to conflict. Organisations and groups working in insecure environments 
recognised the need to work on conflict, both from the perspective of needing to engage in a 
conflict-sensitive manner, but also from the perspective of consciously seeking to support 
transformations to more peaceful and stable conditions. Although there was healthy debate 
on the so-called securitisation of aid (Duffield 2001; Howell and Lind 2009), many 
development actors sought to address insecurities experienced by poor and vulnerable 
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groups – including conflict – as inseparable from the sorts of change that were needed in 
conflict-affected environments (Allouche and Lind 2013). 
 
For many years large-scale official development aid circles focused on resolving conflict and 
supporting peace-building efforts in so-called ‘fragile states’, a concept that has proved 
controversial for a number of reasons. Defining what makes a state ‘fragile’ is problematic, 
with no agreed definition among various governments, militaries and non-governmental 
actors who intervene in such contexts. Inadvertently, the aid focus on so-called ‘fragile 
states’ led to a reduction of aid in places that are not considered ‘fragile’, but that still 
experience extreme poverty and are afflicted by various political and social violence, such as 
India (Fisher 2014; ODI 2006). The emphasis on using aid instruments to transform fragile 
states into more peaceful and stable conditions characterised fraught experiences in ‘state-
building’ in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan and East Timor. The 2011 WDR, however, 
showed that violence was a problem not confined to conflict-affected ‘fragile’ states alone; 
rather, it was a predicament experienced across a spectrum of states and societies, from 
highly advanced industrialised economies to countries experiencing stagnation and 
widespread poverty (World Bank 2011). The focus of work within the AMV programme has 
been in violent settings that often do not easily fit traditional definitions of ‘fragile states’ but 
that nonetheless are characterised by conflict and violence of varying forms and intensities. 
 
Violence is an issue that defines society in many places considered to be poor. Yet, it is not 
a straightforward relationship where violence only inhibits development and creates poverty. 
There are many examples of countries that experienced rapid development and change 
while also experiencing violence, such as India (Cramer 2006; Justino 2015), the United 
States (US), Angola and Brazil (Cramer 2006). Indeed, some claim that violence is a 
fundamental characteristic of state formation processes (Bates 2001; Tilly 1992). Further, 
development does not necessarily result in peaceful outcomes. For instance, there are high 
levels of violence in countries that are considered developed; in the US, in 2013, there were 
16,121 homicide deaths, 5.1 deaths per 100,000 people (CDC 2013) and 25 per cent of 
women have experienced domestic violence (CDC 2011). In Northern Ireland, a total of 
3,568 people were killed between 1969 and 2010 during the ‘Troubles’ (CAIN 2016). 
Violence is not just a problem for poorer or transition countries; it affects states and societies 
across the development continuum. 
 
However, worryingly, countries and areas with a higher prevalence of conflict and violence 
have lagged on achievement of global development indicators (OECD 2015). In 2011, no 
low-income fragile or conflict-affected country had achieved a single MDG; people living in 
these countries are more than twice as likely to be undernourished, three times as likely to 
be unable to send their children to school, and twice as likely to see their children die before 
the age of five, than those people living in other developing countries (World Bank 2011: 5). 
 
As recognition has increased of the need to address violence as a distinct area of scholarly 
and policy analysis, there has been a proliferation of strategies, frameworks, guidance and 
other recommendations to inform development inputs in violence-affected places (including 
the New Deal Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals of the OECD (2011), the World Bank 
WDR 2011, and DFID’s 2010 Building Peaceful States and Societies). The SDGs introduce 
a new emphasis on violence within global development efforts. Goal 16 seeks ‘the promotion 
of peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, the provision of access to 
justice for all, and building effective, accountable institutions at all levels’ (UN 2015). Unlike 
the MDGs which were aimed at developing countries, all of the SDGs are relevant and apply 
in general terms to all countries, including developed countries (Osborn, Cutter and Ullah 
2015). By intending to be universal, the SDGs imply that all countries will need to make 
adjustments in accordance with their political situations, development priorities and ambition, 
and in respect to their policies and priorities. Being universal in scope, in principle the SDGs 
are more likely to encourage new thinking and approaches to addressing the influences of 
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transnational actors and flows on the occurrence and persistence of violence. However, 
while it is envisioned that countries will need to formulate their own approaches to achieving 
the SDGs in view of their development levels, national priorities and policies, this complexity 
is problematic for policymakers and donors (ICSU and ISSC 2015). Access to livelihoods 
and economic development, listed as essential in preceding violence reduction frameworks 
is missing from SDG 16, but is, however, included separately in SDG 8. Goal 16 is 
ambitious, including 12 separate targets (see Box 2.1) covering a wide breadth of issues 
including reducing violence-related deaths, strengthening access to information, legal 
identity and reducing terrorism. 
 
While at the moment most policy efforts remain focused on developing indicators to monitor 
and measure progress in achieving Goal 16, discussion will soon turn to ‘best fit’ approaches 
for reducing violence as a fundamental part of building more secure societies. Goal 16 states 
an ideal end-state, modelled on the experiences and situations existing in countries that 
perform well in governance and development indices. However, when faced with the most 
complex situations (for example, in South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Afghanistan or Yemen), and some middle-income countries (in the Human Development 
Index (HDI) rankings) that experience both growth as well as persistent violence (Colombia, 
Venezuela, South Africa, India), the targets appear far removed from reality. What also 
complicates a clearer idea of how to achieve progress on Goal 16 is that some middle-
income countries have achieved growth and greater prosperity without having in place 
advanced institutions to manage competing interests, or access to justice and inclusive 
forms of politics that are thought to encourage peace and stability. There are many pathways 
towards peaceful and secure societies, as well as many setbacks, diversions and even 
ruptures that are experienced during processes of addressing violence. Some success (and 
much failure) has been achieved through international and regional peacekeeping efforts. 
Some success has been seen through political reforms and institutionalisation of rights at the 
national level, through a combination of a national political settlement and sub-national 
dialogue and mediation, or through locally negotiated agreements that national governments 
agree to respect. Thus, while Goal 16 directs attention to paradigmatic best practice (as 
detailed in the section below), the pathways for addressing and mitigating violence are 




2.2  The violence reduction paradigm 
As referred to earlier, there is consensus at the level of global policy on the broad contours 
of an approach to reducing violence: what is referred to here as the ‘violence reduction 
paradigm’. This consists of four fundamental elements: (1) the establishment of legitimate 
institutions backed by political agreement; (2) strengthening access to justice and security; 
(3) extending economic opportunities and employment; and (4) ensuring the durability of 
peace through societal resilience. These are briefly discussed in turn below. 
 
Firstly, it is thought that violence can be addressed through the creation of legitimate 
institutions and political settlements (OECD 2009; DFID 2010; World Bank 2011; United 
Nations General Assembly 2015). While the concept of political settlements has become 
widely used, there are many definitions, ranging from ‘elite pacts’, to ‘the outcome of a 
peace-process’ or ‘social order’,1 making the term confusing to many. Here, the concept of 
political settlement is used to refer to a process of negotiation that involves formal and 
informal actors as well as formal and informal spaces. It is generally agreed that creating 
durable institutions in post-conflict settings can help to establish and maintain peace and 
manage tensions; equally, durable institutions can plausibly be seen as an outcome not a 
cause of violence reduction. Current thinking is that this can be achieved through political 
settlements that are ‘legitimate, inclusive and transparent’ (DFID 2010). Yet, what might 
appear ‘legitimate’ to an urban-based elite involved in negotiations, could look very different 
to a provincial administrator, or a youth fighter. Further, a political settlement may or may not 
involve an increase in violence; there are multiple phases in the process of negotiating a 
settlement, and the use of violence frequently is one of them, even if it is not directly 
attributable to actors involved in the settlement processes. 
 
 
1 For more in-depth analysis see, www.governanceanddevelopment.com/2012/09/what-on-earth-is-political-settlement.html. 
Box 2.1  Sustainable Development Goal 16 
Goal 16: Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, the provision 
of access to justice for all, and building effective, accountable institutions at all levels 
16.1:  Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere  
16.2:  End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children  
16.3:  Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to 
justice for all  
16.4:  By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and 
return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime  
16.5:  Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms  
16.6:  Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels  
16.7:  Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels  
16.8:  Broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global 
governance  
16.9:  By 2030, provide legal identity for all, including birth registration  
16.10:  Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with 
national legislation and international agreements  
16.a:  Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for 
building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and 
combat terrorism and crime  




Strengthening access to justice and security is a second element of the violence reduction 
paradigm, done through transforming or strengthening institutions that deliver citizen security 
and justice. This was a prominent theme of the WDR 2011 on Conflict, Security and 
Development (World Bank 2011), as well as the WDR 2006 on Equity and Development 
(World Bank 2006). It is thought that widening access to justice will help to build trust 
between citizens and governments, as well as empowering groups who may otherwise have 
sought justice through continued violence. So-called ‘legitimate’ institutions that provide 
justice and security services play an important role in distributing power and rights and, thus, 
their reform is thought to help manage grievances and the risk of conflict. Early priorities 
include stemming government corruption, and reforming police, and drawing on traditional or 
community justice mechanisms, in order to be able to punish unlawful activities capably and 
fairly (World Bank 2011; United Nations General Assembly 2015). 
 
Expanding access to jobs and economic opportunities is a third element, providing 
employment and economic security to those groups who may otherwise gain more respect 
and economic reward from engaging in armed violence. The lack of economic options and 
opportunities for many is seen as a source of instability that, if unaddressed, will increase the 
threat of violence. Creating jobs in conflict and violence-affected countries can be extremely 
challenging, particularly when large numbers of people have been displaced, and there are 
high numbers of ex-combatants (World Bank 2013). Job creation is therefore linked to 
transforming institutions and access to justice, in order to create legal, secure livelihoods 
(OECD 2009; DFID 2010; World Bank 2011, 2013; IA 2015). 
 
A fourth element of the violence reduction paradigm concerns sustainability of these 
interventions, and their resilience against future violence (OECD 2009; DFID 2010; World 
Bank 2011; Oswald and Ruedin 2012; United Nations General Assembly 2015). 
Circumstances of ‘no peace, no war’ characterise many contemporary situations of violent 
conflict (Richards 2004), implying that violence can persist in the system well after the formal 
end of conflict and in spite of years of intervention and external support for peace and 
security. The risk of renewed violence exists in many areas where an agreement or deal 
may have signalled a formal end to conflict, but where political divisions and insecurity 
remain rife, such as in Afghanistan or Iraq. In other places, such as in South Sudan and 
Somalia, external peace, security and counterterrorism support have been an important 
source of rents for national and local elites, but without having contributed to fundamental 
reform and institutionalisation of new norms (De Waal 2015). Given the highly uncertain and 
mixed outcomes of many large-scale peace-building operations in recent years, current 
thinking emphasises the need for durable responses that can be sustained even when 
tensions threaten to spill into wider conflict and violence. 
 
These are the fundamental elements of the current violence reduction paradigm. In global 
policy, it is also widely concurred that armed violence reduction requires an intersectoral, 
multi-level governance approach that promotes genuine local leadership. However, the very 
need for such a ‘comprehensive approach’ itself suggests that reducing violence will 
necessarily be part of a broader transformation in economy, polity and society – something 
that is shown by a political settlements analysis. Yet, truncated aid cycles and the pressure 
to show quick results can result in short-term, projectised interventions that do little to shift 
the underlying drivers of violence. Reducing violence is a long-term goal, and results are not 
guaranteed (Lind 2014). 
 
Notwithstanding the widely accepted need for joined-up responses, there is a lack of 
systematic review and rigorous evidence to support much of the generalised thinking about 
the violence reduction paradigm (OECD 2011). There is even less practically informed 
insight of how they can be achieved in the short and medium term. The limits of the best 
practice paradigm to reducing violence is that it states the obvious: to be less violent, 
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societies and states should become more like places that are already peaceful and stable. 
The elements of reducing violence are well known, but arguably they are the outcomes of 
long processes of change, conflict and adjustment, not logical outcomes of more funding, 
more capacity building and more political attention. The mantra of improved coordination and 
partnership does not necessarily address the more fundamental conundrum of how to act 
effectively as part of a longer-term and dynamic process of moving out of violence. 
 
The rapid emergence of this best practice paradigm is significant on many fronts. It 
establishes priorities for donors desperately searching for answers to what are often 
longstanding situations of violent insecurity and conflict. It directs trends in research funding 
to those areas that are thought to be most likely to uncover ‘solutions’. It directs advocacy 
efforts at international and national levels. It offers an explanation for complex dynamics, 
trends and continuities to a wider public that understands violence to be altogether normal in 
places like Darfur, Somalia and Afghanistan. Moreover, it provides regimes in violence-
affected places a touchstone for seeking international support and funds. 
 
Best practice will take development actors only so far. Far more attention is needed on how 
violence operates, its logic and sense in particular settings. This type of analysis is more 
likely to generate useful insights than measurements of institutional weakness and social 
fragility – based on contrasts with more peaceful and stable situations. The WDR already 
cautioned against the temptation of imposing certain institutional arrangements from one 
state or society onto another, in the hope that it would redress perceived institutional 
weaknesses driving violence. Understanding the historical and political context within which 
violence reduction efforts are implemented, as well as turning to recent experiences in 
violence reduction within the same or similar settings, may provide a better basis for 




3  Understanding violence: themes from the 
Addressing and Mitigating Violence (AMV) 
programme 
 
In the following sections we review key insights from the IDS AMV programme, focusing on 
three key themes that came from our work. All of our work was carried out in violent 
contexts, but not always in places that are considered to be at war or even ‘fragile’. Each 
one provides a richly detailed picture of violence and violence reduction efforts in various 
parts of the world. Based on this body of work, this section uncovers how violence operates 
in particular settings, and through that, understandings of the various ways in which it can be 
reduced, as well as the limits of and constraints on such efforts. Many pathways exist to 
address and mitigate violence, and bespoke approaches are needed, involving negotiations 
and contestations among a whole array of stakeholders. The sections below detail a number 
of key themes: 
 
1. Different forms of violence are interlinked and can reinforce each other; violence has 
a ‘compound’ nature; 
2. Violence is often part of a network, linking local to national to transnational; 
3. The experience of vulnerability and violence are often linked. 
3.1  The ‘compound’ nature of violence 
Different motivations for or causes of violence include: (1) ‘social violence’ which is primarily 
interpersonal and motivated by the will to get or keep social power and control; (2) ‘economic 
violence’ which is motivated by material gain and can take the form of street crime, drug-
related violence and kidnapping; and (3) ‘political violence’ which is inspired by the will to win 
or hold political power (Moser and McIlwaine 2004: 60; Gupte and Bogati 2014: 10–11); 
among others. Violence can manifest itself in a multitude of ways, such as riots, armed 
robberies, terrorism, and sexual and gender-based violence. These are often treated as 
separate from one another. Yet, different forms of violence (including intimate, criminal, 
public, political and state-sponsored) are interlinked and can reinforce one another. Violence 
is a multifaceted, compound phenomenon, with different forms of violence intersecting. It is 
difficult and problematic, analytically, to treat various forms of violence separately, since they 
are closely entangled (Lind 2014). 
 
Work in Nigeria (Niger Delta), Sierra Leone, Egypt and Kenya (Marsabit County) for 
instance, indicates that it is important to recognise that the violence which exists is not just a 
manifestation of criminality or a reflection of social problems but is intimately connected to 
the political processes in these contexts (Schultze-Kraft and Hinkle 2014). 
 
The diagnosis of violence tends to inform the response to it. Responses based on an 
understanding that violence is driven primarily by a seemingly apparent singular ‘cause’, 
such as ‘ethnic clashes’ or ‘gang violence’, have not proven successful at addressing the 
layered factors, and myriad connections among these, that drive violence. Evidence from 
Nairobi and Mumbai for instance illustrates that different types of urban violence are closely 
entwined, with neighbourhoods where riots or post-election violence occurred tending to 
have prevalent crime and gang activities rooted in the lack of opportunity, stark inequalities 
and political manipulations of these (Tranchant 2013b). Thus, pursuing separate policies for 
addressing crime and riots is an ineffective approach. Inequality (both horizontal and 
vertical) correlates strongly with violence. Research in South Asia also indicates that urban 
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violence comes in the form of social violence, economic violence and political violence, all 
three of which are deeply interconnected and extenuate, or are extenuated by, conditions in 
cities (Gupte 2014). Responses to urban violence in India, Pakistan and Nepal have tended 
to be militaristic rather than addressing marginalisation for instance, with limited success in 
preventing urban violence. Failure to respond effectively to violence can result in new 
mutations of violence over time. There is a lack of recognition of the factors behind the 
intergenerational reproduction of violence (through trauma and childhood abuse, for 
example) and political and criminal violence, for instance. Responses to violence are less 
effective if they are crafted in response to an understanding of violence as something driven 
by a singular cause, rather than as a compound phenomenon with many interrelated threads 
and drivers. This is why an intersectoral, multi-level governance approach is needed. 
 
However, understanding violence can be complicated as collecting data and evidence on 
armed violence is challenging. Insecurity makes it more difficult for researchers to meet 
different stakeholders and ask sensitive questions, while national statistics authorities often 
do not cover these areas. Homicide figures are often used to represent violence, yet this fails 
to convey the multiple forms of violence which take place and do not lead to death. Focusing 
on these may privilege the recognition of certain forms of violence and their response. Data 
on how violence operates, its logic and how it makes ‘sense’ in particular places, are often 
lacking. The lack of them makes it difficult to diagnose and respond to situations of violence, 
which might appear mystifying and opaque to ‘outsiders’. 
3.1.1  Nigeria 
Evidence from the Niger Delta indicates that political, economic, and criminal violence are 
interlinked around the struggle over the access to, and distribution of, the country’s huge oil 
wealth, involving changing constellations of actors and interests over time (Schultze-Kraft 
2013). For instance, the armed umbrella organisation Movement for the Emancipation of the 
Niger Delta (MEND) emerged as a result of harsh government action in response to criminal 
activity under a ‘political cover’ by armed gangs. There has been a series of ‘rolling, often 
covert alliances and bargains between state and non-state, and legal and illegal/criminal 
actors in the Delta, and between them and some federal political elites’ (Schultze-Kraft 2013: 
17–18). The 2003 and 2007 election violence saw armed gangs mobilised by politicians 
terrorise citizens and political opponents and stuff or steal ballot boxes. Once the elections 
were over politicians tended to abandon these groups, and many set up their own guns-for-
hire groups, carrying out attacks on oil companies and kidnapping oil workers for profit. In 
the jockeying for power and control of oil rents ‘organised crime increasingly penetrated 
Nigeria’s political system; political ends and criminal means became dangerously entwined’ 
(Schultze-Kraft 2013: 25). Violence had become a ‘hard currency’ that was used by many 
actors to press their demands and achieve their own intertwined political and economic 
goals. Profit-seeking criminals adopted the claims of genuine ‘resource agitators’ seeking to 
achieve more control of the oil wealth for the benefit of the Niger Delta populations 
(Schultze-Kraft 2013). Many leaders of these armed groups were co-opted into the political 
settlement. Meanwhile, underlying problems were unsolved, including incessant oil spills 
leading to pollution of farmlands and rivers, large-scale unemployment, lack of social and 
physical infrastructure including schools, hospitals and roads, corrupt and unaccountable 
politicians, and a refusal of the federal government to increase the oil revenue allocation 
accruable to the Delta states beyond the 13 per cent stipulated by the 1999 Constitution. 
3.1.2  Kenya 
Political, ethnic, religious, and regional violence in Kenya is closely interconnected (Lind, 
Mutahi and Oosterom 2015; Scott-Villiers et al. 2014; Ruteere et al. 2013). This is apparent 
in how actors involved in violence mobilise along multiple identities – political, criminal and 
sometimes cultural (Ruteere et al. 2013). In some instances, in Nairobi’s poor 
neighbourhoods, criminal violence and vigilante responses can mutate into ethnic or political 
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violence depending on the ethnicity of the victims or perpetrators. In other cases, ethnic or 
political violence hides behind acts of criminal violence (Ruteere et al. 2013). Non-state 
violent actors such as the Mungiki (a secretive sect and banned criminal organisation) can 
work both as enforcers and mobilisers for politicians and as criminal gangs (Ruteere et al. 
2013). The recent attacks by Al-Shabaab and sympathiser groups are also increasingly 
intertwined with deepening regional and ethnic divisions as a result of uneven development 
patterns and the treatment of certain groups. In addition, criminal organisations have used 
similar tactics to Al-Shabaab to exploit the situation of insecurity in pursuit of their political 
and business agendas (Lind et al. 2015). 
 
Responses to violence and crime in Nairobi’s poor neighbourhoods have tended to treat it as 
ordinary crime, the result of a lack of law and order, and focus on more robust policing 
measures which have actually aggravated the underlying causes of insecurity (Ruteere et al. 
2013). There is little public trust in the police and without reforms which address this, 
including an end to impunity for police crimes and a more accessible justice system, more 
robust policing measures are unlikely to succeed. In addition, focusing on policing does little 
to address the multiple drivers of violence, which are better served by an approach which 
addresses more deeply rooted problems of poverty and unemployment, particularly among 
young people, and the lack of basic services in poor neighbourhoods. Attempts have been 
made to develop a joined-up multisectoral approach through the Safer Nairobi Initiative; 
however, it fell victim to political tugs-of-war and lack of confidence in the city council 
(Ruteere et al. 2013). 
 
A response to high levels of political violence in Kenya, rooted in contests over highly 
centralised powers, was to devolve power to newly established county governments. 
However, devolution reforms failed to deal with the effect of persistent low-level violence in 
the political system itself. Struggles over the spoils of devolution, both in relation to power 
and economic benefit, have played out violently along ethnic lines and shifted the tipping 
point for violence to the sub-national level, mixing economic, political and social violence 
(Scott-Villiers et al. 2014). 
 
In response to the threat of Al-Shabaab, the state has pursued a range of ‘hard’ measures, 
including military intervention in Somalia (Operation Linda Nchi), police raids on 
predominantly Muslim neighbourhoods of Nairobi and the incarceration of several thousand 
civilians (Operation Usalama Watch), as well as introducing draconian new amendments to 
security legislation. The Kenyan security response to the Al-Shabaab attacks was framed 
around the perception that Al-Shabaab is an ‘external’ threat to Kenya’s peace and security, 
ignoring the substantial ‘internal’ factors that have contributed to the rise of violent extremism 
in Kenya (Lind et al. 2015). In fact, Operation Linda Nchi, and the harassment of Kenyan 
Somalis and Muslims in Operation Usalama Watch, in the name of security, has been 
counterproductive and feeds into Al-Shabaab’s exploitation of the country’s deep, structural 
divisions. Responses should instead pursue interrelated political, governance and security 
reforms addressing violence in the country’s margins and aim to have the greatest impacts 
for its marginalised populations (Lind et al. 2015). 
3.1.3  Nepal 
Since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was established in 2006, war-related deaths 
have decreased but urban violence has been on the rise. The authorities have struggled to 
respond to this growing problem. The nature of the existing urban violence is related to a 
multitude of factors which cannot be addressed by formal policing alone (Gupte and Bogati 
2014). Violence in Nepal’s urban areas arises from a complex range of political, institutional, 
economic, ethnic/identity and social factors. Both politically motivated and economically 
driven organised crime groups have a significant impact on both public security and local 
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governance and elections, and political parties have been using criminal groups for political 
purposes. 
 
Individual initiatives which are not part of a wider strategy have not been successful at 
addressing this urban violence. Like in Nairobi, the nature of the existing violence, with its 
complex social and economic problems and involvement of various criminal gangs, makes it 
difficult for formal policing and security structures to address on their own. Therefore, a 
combination of different policies to reduce crime and violence, ranging from addressing 
different youth issues and needs to reduce risk factors, community-based partnerships that 
seek to develop the ability of individuals and communities to respond to problems of crime 
and violence, urban planning and design, as well as improving police capacity, resources 
and training issues, seem more likely to succeed (Gupte and Bogati 2014). 
3.1.4  Egypt 
In the aftermath of the 2011 revolution in Egypt, levels of political, economic and social 
(including religious and gender-based) violence all increased dramatically (Tadros 2014). 
This violence was sometimes interconnected; for example, members of Islamist forces 
belonging to the Salafis and Gama’at imposed ransoms on Copts in Upper Egypt as 
‘protection money’ (so as not to subject them to assault). It was political violence as it 
complied with the belief of these Islamists that non-Muslims must show subservience to 
Muslims as part of the instatement of an Islamist governance system; it was economic 
violence as the intention was to collect money; and it was social violence as it was intended 
to instil the notion that Copts are second class citizens. In addition, politically motivated 
sexual assaults were carried out against women to deter them from political activism. 
Violence around economic control of informal street vendors became entangled in incidents 
of political violence (Tadros 2014). Political violence around the revolution also had its roots 
in economic drivers and a desire for social justice (Mitchell 2015a). 
 
The international community’s understanding of the underlying causes of violence is very 
different from that of Egyptian citizens. The international community expected that the lack of 
inclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood in the political settlement and the security sector’s 
excessive use of force against them would result in citizens condemning the violence against 
the Muslim Brotherhood and would delegitimise the political order. However, the people 
were broadly supportive of the state’s response to the Muslim Brotherhood and did not 
believe reconciliation (an inclusive political settlement) would decrease the violence and 
therefore rejected the international community’s involvement (Tadros 2014). 
3.1.5  Sierra Leone 
Sierra Leone’s conflict ended in 2002 with an externally imposed peace agreement. The 
international community has focused its post-war reconstruction efforts on rebuilding 
governance institutions, particularly the chieftancy, that existed before the war. Less effort 
was placed on addressing the more complex sociological factors that contributed to the civil 
war, including the marginalisation of young people, lack of opportunity and skewed 
distribution of resources. As a result similar conditions exist today, as did prior to the war. 
 
Evidence from Sierra Leone shows how anger and frustration at inequalities are manifesting 
as violence in the mining areas, on the streets, and in universities and schools. In addition, 
tensions still exist as a result of incomplete reintegration of ex-combatants and lack of 
progress in the reconciliation process. This social and economic violence is closely 
connected to political violence as a result of manipulation by politicians. Violent incidents 
often spiked around election times, although peace-building and violence mitigation 
strategies and programmes around the 2012 elections helped prevent violence during the 




3.1.6  Summary 
Violence reduction and post-conflict initiatives and policies often focus on just one type of 
violence, based on assumptions about what that ‘type’ of violence is – whether political, 
ethnic, gang, interpersonal or terrorist. Isolated projects are implemented, working with 
partners who also focus on one type of violence or one group of people, and who are 
unaccustomed to working on different types of violence. The responsibility for addressing 
violence is often situated within a specific government department, unit or aid body that is 
unaccustomed to working across boundaries. For example, domestic violence is usually 
dealt with by organisations that focus on women. However, in order to address domestic 
violence it is necessary to work within many sectors, such as justice, enforcement, health 
and education with men and women alike. Equally important are ‘readings’ of violence. The 
views of government officials may be very different to those of grass-roots organisations, or 
individuals experiencing day-to-day violence. It may be politically expedient for someone to 
claim that the issue is domestic violence or gang violence, when it is in fact state-sponsored. 
The ability to correctly identify the risks, causes and impacts of violence is of great 
importance for policy and programming. 
 
Violence reduction and post-conflict peace-building initiatives need to be interconnected, in 
order to address the violence issue as a whole, rather than as discrete, unrelated problems. 
Further, it is not just about reducing day-to-day levels of violence on the ground, it is also 
about addressing the issues at multiple levels, with multiple actors, and across multiple 
areas of government. Due to the pervasiveness of violence in many settings, many actors 
working on development in these settings will also be involved in violence mitigation work, 
even if they do not label it as such (OECD 2011). It is important to recognise this and include 
these actors and their work within violence reduction programmes and coordination. 
 
The frameworks and guidelines we outline at the beginning of this report focus on the big 
drivers of violence reduction: economics, access to justice, institutions and political 
settlements. Taken as a whole, they might address the ‘compound’ character of violence. 
The risk, however, is that they are pursued as separate threads, with little coordination and 
effort to connect dots across different areas of experience, expertise and specialisation. 
Given the interconnected nature of the issues around violence, we argue that there is a great 
need to integrate the issues in order to successfully and sustainably reduce violence. 
3.2  Connectivity of actors across levels and space 
Often when looking at violence, the focus tends to be on conflict dynamics at the national 
level, and making cross-country comparisons. Sub-national and micro-level dynamics are 
often overlooked (Luckham 2015; Justino and Balcells 2014). Moreover, the nature of 
politics is often fractal, with similar dynamics and relationships reproduced at multiple levels 
(De Waal 2015). The implication is that violence operating at a particular level, such as at 
the sub-national level, is often knitted closely with national-level divisions and actors, as well 
as transnational flows and actors. Violence can become a valid tool for national and local 
community conversations and settlements. The case studies indicate that the transnational 
and citizen levels are very important to consider. Thus, a multi-level governance approach is 
essential to understand how violence operates through the connectivity of actors, 
negotiations and conflict across levels and space. 
 
Evidence gathered by the AMV programme, especially in relation to political settlements, 
indicated the importance of relationships between the state and elites with local actors, 
donors, business networks and transnational corporations (Mitchell 2015a). National elites 
are often closely connected with global elites, as can be seen in the Niger Delta. 
Borderlands have become sites of heightened tension and violence. The important role that 





However, it is also clear that individuals are active agents and agency at the local level feeds 
into violence dynamics operating at wider scales. Research looking at political settlements 
and violence in Egypt and Marsabit County indicates that ordinary citizens’ role in the 
process is often neglected by policy approaches aiming for peaceful political settlements. 
Citizens confer legitimacy to higher level political settlements and have the ability to shape 
and break them, including by taking recourse to violence (Schultze-Kraft and Hinkle 2014). 
 
It must also be recognised that perpetrators and victims are often interchangeable, with 
victims perpetrating, and perpetrators being victims of violence, not just at a local level but 
also at a national level. State force can be used to keep citizens secure, as well as to inflict 
violence upon them. At a local level, young men especially are both the majority of victims 
and perpetrators of violence. Individuals can demand their rights to security provision and 
act themselves to mitigate it. Evidence from Cape Town and Mumbai shows that local 
groups are working to prevent violence, and problems of urban violence are best addressed 
through cooperation between the state and citizens (Gupte, Shahrokh and Wheeler 2014b). 
Nurturing these civil spaces to keep alive voices against violence is a vital area to be 
addressed. Policies addressing violence prevention and mitigation should link between and 
across local, provincial and national levels (Gupte et al. 2014b). However, it is also 
recognised that actors who ‘keep peace’ and ‘protect communities’ often do this through 
violent means, such as the Mungkiki in Nairobi, and gangs in Cape Town and Mumbai. 
Policies also need to support political processes at both the macro and micro level 
simultaneously to advance towards the goal of effective violence mitigation. However, 
citizens are rarely engaged with, despite the importance of building security with those who 
live in the midst of insecurity. 
3.2.1  Niger Delta 
The violence in the Niger Delta indicates the important role transnational actors can play in 
local violence (Schultze-Kraft 2013). During the early 1990s, troops were deployed at the 
request of transnational oil companies to quell protests; while during the transition to civilian 
government they were able to negotiate a new deal by ‘offering “protection” contracts to 
organised militant youth groups in return for an informal license to operate in the Delta 
undisturbed’ (Schultze-Kraft 2013: 14). These private security guards helped fan the 
violence in the Niger Delta, alongside militant and criminal groups, and government forces. 
The large direct cash payments to community leaders and community assistance/ 
development programmes funded by the major oil companies helped to deepen the violence 
by raising expectations of rents and stirring inter-ethnic tensions over community 
development resources (Schultze-Kraft 2013). 
 
In addition, the neglect of the local level through the exclusion of the interests of the Delta 
communities themselves in the political settlement, undermines the country’s long-term 
stability. The case of Nigeria indicates that an ‘inclusive enough’ political settlement is 
inadequate, as co-opting different militia leaders into the settlement has not resulted in any 
concrete changes to how the country’s natural resource wealth is distributed or addressed 
socioeconomic grievances, poverty, criminality and violence in the Delta and other parts of 
the country (Schultze-Kraft 2013). It is important that political settlements also include 
democratic, pro-development and non-violent counter-elites, which would require significant 
and coordinated governance reforms at the local, regional and federal levels. Strengthening 
accountability mechanisms at the local and regional levels are perceived to be crucial, as 
well. 
3.2.2  Kenya 
Evidence gathered in Kenya indicates that transnational actors and processes have fed into 
Kenya’s system of violence, connecting its ‘internal’ and ‘external’ stresses (Lind et al. 2015; 
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Lind and Dowd 2015). As described previously, Al-Shabaab has exploited already existing 
tensions and the government’s security response of counterproductive targeting of Somalis 
and Muslims more generally, to localise jihad within Kenya (Lind et al. 2015). 
 
Evidence from Kenya also indicates that one reason why violence endures in the country is 
the very nature of its kleptocratic politics. Informal power extends outwards from elites at the 
centre through a ‘rhizomatous’ network of administrators, police and security officials, 
criminal bosses and other business interests at lower levels, with violence continuing to 
shape governance structures and political relationships at multiple levels in Kenya (Scott-
Villiers et al. 2014). The local and national levels reinforce one another. Individual 
community responses to violence often serve to fuel it further, through actions such as 
revenge attacks and expectations in relation to violent clientelism. Alternatively, in Marsabit, 
Kenya, the efforts to reduce violence that are most widely regarded are those of unfunded 
local citizens, often women’s organisations. However, they have little traction on the 
underlying rhizomes of power, and politics continues to undermine citizen-led peace 
processes (ibid.). 
 
Local-level leaders, as well as national political figures, were active in mobilising violence 
against members of other communities in Kenya. Much of the violence in poor 
neighbourhoods is carried out by criminal organisations and linked to complex local-level 
political struggles. Not recognising the instrumental use of violence in local politics has 
meant that interventions have failed to involve influential local-level figures. Responses to 
violence need to consider multiple levels of governance and politics, not just that instigated 
by national political figures, with the role of community-level political entrepreneurs being 
especially crucial (Ruteere et al. 2013). Official responses to violence in Nairobi’s poor 
neighbourhoods have also tended to neglect the lessons learnt at the local level. 
 
Evidence from work in Marsabit County also indicates that it is important for local citizens to 
participate in violence mitigation policies. Their participation will help mitigate against 
generalising about ethnic rivalry, primordial raiding and root-and-branch corruption and help 
with understanding why people participate in violence and the links with the political 
struggles surrounding devolution (Schultze-Kraft and Hinkle 2014). 
3.2.3  West Africa and the transnational cocaine trade 
The transnational cocaine trade has been associated with recent episodes of political 
instability and violence in Guinea-Bissau, Guinea and Mali, and is perceived to threaten 
stability in other West African countries, although it has not reached the levels witnessed in 
several Latin American drug source and transit countries. Evidence indicates that internal 
and external stresses are not separate but relate to and reinforce one another as they are 
interconnected through transnational actors and processes that are part of broader 
globalising dynamics (Schultze-Kraft 2014). 
 
The high value of the cocaine trade offers great opportunity for corruption and manipulation 
of political systems with the resultant potential for insecurity, in competition over drug 
trafficking rents. West African countries have seen their existing modes of governance 
influenced and transformed as a result of cocaine trafficking. External actors include both 
those involved in trafficking cocaine and those trying to combat it. Externally designed and 
funded strategies to curb the flow of illicit drugs through West Africa are not sufficiently 
taking into account the transnational nature of the cocaine trade and the interplay of internal 
and external factors (Schultze-Kraft 2014). It is not enough to enhance law enforcement, 
drug interdiction and judicial capacities but requires broader political, economic and 
governance reforms to address the root causes of insecurity (Schultze-Kraft 2014; Collodi 
2014). In addition, policies to tackle drug trafficking and organised criminality in West Africa 
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require more concerted efforts to coordinate regional and national-level policies, in tandem 
with global efforts. 
3.2.4  Sierra Leone 
There is some argument that international donor involvement in Sierra Leone’s political 
settlement, with its focus on the political elite, has recreated the political and socioeconomic 
conditions prior to the conflict and has made it vulnerable to relapsing into violent conflict 
(Allouche 2013a). Donors believed that the centralisation of power was a driver in the conflict 
and therefore pushed a reintroduction of decentralised institutions such as the chieftaincy, as 
described above. However, this overlooked the abuse and corruption by traditional chiefs 
which has been an underlying cause of the conflict. The lack of involvement of local-level 
non-elite actors in the political settlement, especially youth and rural mining communities, 
contributes to insecurity and the potential for new violence to flare. 
3.2.5  Egypt 
Regional insecurity in the Middle East and North Africa resulted in a proliferation of small 
arms, which has been blamed for contributing to the rising levels of violence in Egypt in the 
aftermath of the 2011 revolution (Tadros 2014). Control of these weapons depends on the 
internal policies of neighbouring countries and the foreign relations between Egypt and its 
neighbours more generally. 
 
The importance of local-level actors is evident, where the violence perpetrated by youth 
groups in response to the majoritarian approach to governance pursued by the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the lack of an inclusive political settlement, was condoned by the very 
limited expressions of public condemnation of it (Tadros 2014). The public also played a key 
role in rejecting the use of political violence to influence the nature of the political settlement, 
when the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to use violence against those who had ousted 
them. Through their acceptance or rejection of the use of political violence, the people gave 
legitimacy to its use in influencing the shape of the political settlement that they approved of 
(Tadros 2014). The international community’s support for an inclusive settlement involving 
Morsi and a focus on violence perpetrated against the Muslim Brotherhood has resulted in 
Egyptians perceiving that the international community are against them and rejecting their 
attempts to influence the political settlement. Stable political settlements also need ordinary 
citizens to feel that the process and outcome of the political settlement is legitimate (Tadros 
2014). Policies which focus too narrowly on the policymakers involved in the political 
settlement miss strategic points of influence and engagement arising as a result of these 
local factors. While it would be risky to determine the terms of engagement of any political 
settlement on the sentiment of the populace, citizens’ experiences, perceptions and 
expectations should not be neglected while forging elite alliances. 
3.2.6  South Africa 
Approaches to addressing violence tend not to focus on the role of citizens living in violence-
affected areas in acting to stop violence and promote peaceful relations. A pilot study on 
gender-based violence in Cape Town assessed the role citizenship and agency played in 
reducing different types of urban violence (Shahrokh and Wheeler 2014). Empathy, 
interpersonal relationships, and claiming individual and collective rights are factors that 
enable agency to reduce violence, while ongoing support, attention to emotional wellbeing, 
and participation in wider networks can sustain it. Discriminatory norms; personal risk; the 
systemic relationship between violence, poverty and inequality; and lack of institutional 
accountability and responsiveness inhibit agency to reduce violence. 
 
The study recommends seeing citizens as potential partners who can contribute to building 
safer communities. Thus it is important that policies addressing violence prevention and 
mitigation link the citizens with the provincial and national levels, as well as between diverse 
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stakeholders. The role of local communities is undervalued in the current policy framework in 
South Africa (Shahrokh and Wheeler 2014). 
3.2.7  Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia 
The cross-border violence experienced in the border region between Côte d’Ivoire and 
Liberia has interlinked internal and regional dynamics relating to a history of violence, ethnic 
and land tensions, and political crisis. While both sides sought to address the situation 
through short-term security responses, ultimately they fail to agree on the basis of the 
insecurity or the correct response strategy (Allouche and Mohammed 2014). Côte d’Ivoire 
sees the problem coming from Liberia and has attempted to ‘buy off’ armed groups with 
financial incentives. Liberia believes the problem comes from Côte d’Ivoire and has 
responded by trying to secure its territory through border controls and closures, and attempts 
to win over the local population in the Liberian border area. Neither strategy is sustainable or 
resolves underlying grievances. A regional response is the most promising solution to the 
cross-border violence. It is also important to engage and involve the local communities. 
3.2.8  Summary 
Actors involved in both violence and peace-building are found at all levels of politics and 
governance: international, transnational, national, regional and local. In order to address the 
multitude of actors who are involved in violence and in peace-building, there is a need for a 
multi-level governance approach. Moreover, reducing violence can only be achieved by 
involving those who are affected by violence or take part in it. However, micro-level and 
transnational actors are often ignored by policymakers, as are the links between ‘legitimate’ 
and unlawful actors (for example, state actors colluding with criminal groups as part of illicit 
enterprises). Violence is a tool used as a method of communication, to show dissatisfaction 
with the current state of affairs, and if relevant actors are not engaged with peace-building 
processes, they will not see them as legitimate. What is happening locally must be 
connected with other levels. In practice this is very challenging, and there are difficulties in 
coordination and communication. There is also a lack of evidence that examines the multiple 
levels of violent actors, which must be addressed before significant change can be made 
(Luckham 2015). 
3.3  Identity, vulnerability and the experience of violence 
Violence is not experienced equally everywhere and by everyone. Horizontal and vertical 
inequalities are correlated with violence; and age, gender, poverty and wealth, ethnic or 
religious identity can result in a different experience of violence. In Egypt, for example, 
women and girls restrict their mobility to avoid being exposed to violence (Oosterom and 
McGee 2014). Violence can be used against particular groups as a tactic to exclude, with 
violence against women in Egypt being used to manage women’s dissent and their 
engagement in the public sphere. Aspects of citizens’ identities inform the ways in which 
they cope with or mitigate violence and while social identities overlap, sometimes one 
identity particularly shapes a response to violence. Urban youth populations, for instance, 
tend to suffer from vulnerabilities such as high unemployment and are both perpetrators and 
victims of violence; for some, violence can be a route to identity and voice (Gupte, te Lintelo 
and Barnett 2014a). Evidence gathered in Nepal indicates that urban poverty, lack of 
education, and feelings of powerlessness result in some young people engaging in violent 
and criminal behaviour (Gupte and Bogati 2014). However, young people are also most 
likely to be victims of violence in Nepal. 
 
Personal and spatial vulnerability and violence are interconnected, especially in relation to 
multidimensional poverty, lack of services and inequalities. Evidence from Nairobi and 
Maharashtra indicates that multiple vulnerabilities such as lack of steady income and lack of 
access to services are deeply connected to urban violence (Tranchant 2013b). Research in 
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South Asia indicates that the urban poor are disproportionately affected by endemic crime 
and violence and terrorist attacks (Gupte 2014). Individuals experience insecurity in the city 
in significantly different ways. For example, women, children or poor people’s experience of 
urban violence and insecurity can vary not only by the individual, but also depending on 
where they are and when the violence is occurring (Gupte 2014). A similar dynamic is 
observable in Cape Town, where insecurity is an inherent part of existing conditions of 
vulnerability in townships, although women and illegal immigrants are particularly vulnerable 
(Shahrokh and Wheeler 2014). To tackle urban violence, policies must address this 
vulnerability–violence nexus and explicitly link violence reduction strategies with poverty 
alleviation strategies (Tranchant 2013b). While top-down joined-up approaches have proven 
difficult to implement, community-led initiatives have had success (Tranchant 2013b). 
Reducing people’s vulnerability can reduce exposure to violence. Evidence gathered around 
the provision of services and violence found that inequitable distribution of services can 
result in resentment, leading to conflict and violence; while providing access to services has 
been found to reduce violence and insecurity (Mitchell 2015b). 
3.3.1  Egypt 
Surveys in Egypt looking at responses to violence found that people who are economically 
deprived were more likely to report reducing the number of times they left their home than 
those who come from an economically better-off background (Tadros 2014). This indicates a 
direct correlative relationship between poverty and vulnerability to conflict. Violence also 
disproportionately restricts women’s mobility compared to men. Christians were less likely to 
go out after dark or leave their neighbourhood than Muslims. Violence negatively affects 
human development, hitting the most vulnerable the hardest, which in Egypt are those in the 
lowest income bracket and those living in rural areas (ibid.). 
3.3.2  India 
Evidence gathered in India indicated that there is a link between vulnerability and the 
experience of violence. The impoverished urban areas in India tend to be sites persistently 
afflicted by outbreaks of riots and crime (Tranchant 2013a). Urban Maharashtra experiences 
inadequate housing, poor service provision, lack of access to health and sanitation, 
overcrowded spaces, and limited employment opportunities. In these areas, there is a strong 
correlation between vulnerability and exposure to violence, with the most vulnerable areas 
and households experiencing the most violence. These are the areas most severely affected 
by lack of services, employment opportunities and social capital (ibid.). In addition, the most 
economically, socially and spatially vulnerable households suffer most from civil violence, 
with socioeconomic vulnerability positively linked with acute vulnerability to violence. 
 
The linkages between vulnerability and violence are complex, and sometimes the most 
vulnerable end up participating in violence, as lack of jobs results in them turning to the 
criminal sector in order to survive (Tranchant 2013a). In addition, extreme inequality can 
generate frustrations and aggression, while inadequate service provision and the resulting 
competition for resources is also likely to fuel crime and violence. The potential for 
communal violence rises considerably when these tensions coincide with ethnicity or 
religious markers (ibid.). 
 
However, the linkages between urban violence and vulnerability are seldom tackled in a 
systematic manner at the policy level. The interconnection of crime, violence and 
vulnerability has to be explicitly recognised for both development and security policies to 
succeed (Tranchant 2013a). A joined-up approach is essential to improve security for the 
urban poor. Long-term violence reduction requires engagement with political, economic, 
social and cultural issues. Civil society organisations and ordinary citizens need to engage in 
a participatory process with the police to reduce violence (ibid.). In addition, the participation 
of slum dwellers is important to tackle both vulnerabilities and violence in an integrated and 
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efficient way. Community policing has been held up as a way to reduce violence in 
Maharashtra, such as the Mohalla committees and the Slum Police Panchayats (Tranchant 
2013a). 
 
Evidence from India also indicates that in the medium term, government expenditure on 
social services is associated with significant reductions in riots across India (Justino 2015). 
This is likely to be as a result of a time-lag in the impact of social expenditure on levels of 
poverty and inequality on social discontent and rioting. 
3.3.3  Kenya 
Evidence from Nairobi’s poor neighbourhoods indicates that violence and crime enmesh with 
wider problems of vulnerability (Ruteere et al. 2013). The urban poor are more vulnerable to 
being victimised by non-state violent actors and sections of the state involved in inciting and 
perpetrating violence and crime as a result of widespread poverty and lack of livelihood 
opportunities. In addition, poverty and the lack of economic opportunities for young people 
are often key motivations for their involvement in violence, crime and insecurity (ibid.). A 
similar dynamic can be observed in Sierra Leone, where persistent inequalities and lack of 
opportunities are leading to frustration among young people, who may engage in violence as 
a result of organised crime and gang membership offering them a sense of belonging and 
purpose (Allouche 2013a). As a result there needs to be more focus on youth employment 
and empowerment, especially for the increasing numbers of urban youth (ibid.). 
 
Lack of health, education, social care and policing service provision by the state has allowed 
criminal organisations and gangs to provide illegal connections to public utilities, mediate 
access to economic opportunities, and operate protection rackets. Control and enforcement 
of order is carried out by non-state violent actors, as well as other community mobilisation 
efforts, leading to new forms of insecurity for residents of these areas (Ruteere et al. 2013). 
 
The response has tended to only focus on robust policing and tougher laws which neglects 
the other underlying issues. However, some initiatives have been put in place to address 
some of the factors that make the poor vulnerable to violence, including by local community 
groups. These include income-generating activities, the construction of sanitation facilities, 
lighting and water kiosks (Ruteere et al. 2013). Thus, responses to address and mitigate 
violence are recommended to be multisectoral and cross-agency, encompassing measures 
that reduce the urban poor’s susceptibility to being victimised and build on existing local 
efforts to address interlocking vulnerabilities (ibid.). 
3.3.4  Summary 
Vulnerability and violence are intimately connected. Some people experience the negative 
effects of violence and conflict more than others, and some groups are more susceptible to 
being drawn into networks of violence than others. There is (at least anecdotal) evidence 
that provision of services to the most vulnerable and marginalised groups has reduced the 
likelihood of people becoming the perpetrators of violence, as well as decreasing their 
vulnerability to violence. It would therefore follow that violence reduction and peace-building 




4  Conclusion2 
4.1  Defining the challenge of reducing armed violence 
Addressing and mitigating violence has become a key focus of development in recent years 
and the rationale for aid in many settings. Most accept the need to reduce violence as a 
fundamental requirement for development, a way of measuring and indicating progress in 
times of dynamic change globally and in places remote from political and economic power. 
Yet doing so requires understanding much more how violence operates, its logic and ‘sense’ 
in particular settings. 
 
Violence is not the opposite of peace, and may exist in spite of there being no armed conflict 
or war. Violence is a reality in many settings, and it is often part of state-building as well as 
the processes leading to broader political agreements. This has major implications for how it 
is tackled because, in many places, it has become an integral tool for national and 
community conversations, as well as political practice and economic enterprise. Violence 
frequently happens alongside processes of economic growth and transformation, particularly 
where growth dynamics may be both rapid and exclusionary, leaving many behind. Issues of 
equity and inclusion matter greatly, but in many places the pace of economic change 
outpaces institutional innovation to ensure a broader sharing of benefits. In contexts where 
historical struggles around dispossession have flared on and off they find renewed vigour yet 
there is the likelihood of both the struggles and discourses being usurped by violent 
extremist groups, such as what has happened in different parts of the Middle East, North 
Africa and the Horn of Africa. 
 
Inclusion and the competition around inclusion is a key variable in many situations of 
violence, underlining the recent turn to political settlements as a way of addressing and 
mitigating violence. Inclusive outcomes are desired, but much harder to find in practice. 
What happens when political settlements do not settle anything? Might the political 
settlement itself be a detriment to inclusive peace when institutions operate badly in an 
unaccountable, repressive political order? Who in fundamentally abusive systems is going to 
build institutions, promote reforms and build constituencies for change? Understanding 
power – where it is mobilised from, distributed, and sustained for whom and with what 
consequences – is integral. In many places, crucial insights are missing on elites – who they 
are, what their interests are, their relationships with one another and transnational actors, 
and the subaltern networks through which business is conducted and security negotiated. 
Too often, the absence of elite accountability has the potential to mask larger insecurity 
questions that plague particular places. Resources and methods deployed towards fighting 
insurgent groups are used in the same way to deal with admittedly violent criminals, thereby 
threatening the justice chain. In order for collective security to be pursued there is need for 
national consensus on the regime’s approach to addressing armed violence and the 
willingness of citizens to cede certain freedoms in order for the state to effectively exercise 
the legitimate use of force. The absence of this consensus between the regime and citizens 
is often exacerbated by ineffective communication by states globally about who and what is 




2 For their excellent thoughts and contributions that have influenced the writing of this section, the authors wish to acknowledge 
the participants of the final workshop organised for the IDS AMV programme, held at Goodenough College, London,               
12 November 2015. 
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The emphasis on ensuring political stability through negotiations, bargaining and accords 
can simply further entrench elite power. This can be damaging to security more broadly. For 
example, Nigeria’s political settlement has been remarkably resilient and unchanged in spite 
of decades of political turmoil and sub-national conflict. The same elites continue to 
dominate. The so-called ‘real politics’ explains how exclusionary politics works in practice, 
and why it is so difficult to challenge (De Waal 2015). Non-democratic and exclusionary 
settlements can be reinforced by constituencies in the global North intent on securing access 
to resources, land and markets. The influences of transnationalism and networked global 
capital can also work against forces seeking a more inclusive political agreement. High 
levels of illicit financial flows can make elites detached and unresponsive to the needs of a 
wider citizenry. Moreover, if the implicit purpose of a regime is kleptocratic enrichment, illicit 
financial flows clearly enable that, making peace-building efforts look hollow. This is beyond 
the power and capabilities of development actors alone to tackle, let alone individual aid 
entities or peace-building missions. 
 
Still, there is a risk that an emphasis on national political settlements and political 
marketplaces overplays the role of elites and underplays the agency of local people and 
groups, whether to support violence or to resist or contain it. A subtle shift in emphasis, from 
inclusive settlements towards inclusive outcomes from political settlements, is useful for 
gauging the wider security implications of elite political negotiations and bargaining (Mitchell 
2015a). Moreover, evidence-based work in Nigeria (Niger Delta), Sierra Leone, Egypt and 
Kenya (Marsabit County) suggests that ‘inclusivity’ – unless defined precisely for the political 
and social contexts in which it is used – is a weak indicator of whether a political settlement 
will result in less violence (Schultze-Kraft and Hinkle 2014: 4). For example, political 
devolution in Kenya as a way to address national political violence has resulted in increased 
levels of sub-national violence and tensions. Every level of political administration has its 
own exclusionary mechanisms; escaping elite capture is not as simple as devolving greater 
powers to the local level, even though it might increase the abilities of citizens to practice 
oversight and hold leaders to account. 
 
It is important to understand whether and how violence is reduced through the expansion of 
a political settlement to include additional social groups, as well as who is included, and why. 
Violence associated with specific groups or events (such as electoral competition, organised 
criminal activities or predatory resource acquisition) will require different approaches and 
need to include different actors (Schultze-Kraft and Hinkle 2014). The political settlement 
needs to be an acceptable and sustainable solution both for the elites and for society, with 
citizen participation essential (Allouche 2013b; Oosterom and McGee 2014). A vital question 
is how to nurture civil spaces, near the centre or sub-nationally, which keep alive the voices 
against violence and for political and democratic solutions. What agency do people at the 
grass roots have, how can they insist on accountability, and how can they be supported? It 
must also be understood that citizen identities are ‘multifaceted’ and varied, making it 
important for aid interventions and violence reduction programmes to engage in a 
‘multifaceted’ way (Oosterom and McGee 2014). 
4.2  Intervention and the role of aid 
The inclusion of a goal explicitly addressing issues of peace and justice in the SDGs is a 
significant milestone for efforts to address and mitigate violence. While it does not provide 
immediate solutions for the most intractable situations of violence that exist today, it does for 
the first time provide a transformative vision that links together security, peace, justice, and 
governance. Policy thinking on reducing armed violence already emphasises the need for 
integrated responses, joining up interventions across sectors at all levels of governance 
(OECD 2009, 2011, 2015). The complexity of drivers and influences on violence at multiple 
scales has led many to advocate for responses that are multidisciplinary, multisectoral and 
implemented at multiple levels, as well as for integrated and whole-of-government 
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approaches bringing together justice, policing, development and conflict-resolution expertise. 
This is also explicit in the SDGs, and is supported by evidence from the AMV case studies 
reviewed in this report. However, AMV research also reveals the difficulty of making this 
happen in practice. For instance, while gender-based violence is being tackled through an 
integrated response in South Africa, challenges exist in implementation of the integrated 
structures, including lack of funding, poor coordination among structure members, poor 
monitoring and evaluation systems, and the inadequacy and ineffectiveness of some of the 
structures (Shahrokh and Wheeler 2014). Further, the pressures of aid cycles and funder 
demands for results, can lead to short-term ‘projectised’ interventions that do not address 
the underlying drivers of violence, which require long-term commitment and support (Lind 
2014). 
 
A further issue that must be confronted in order for violence to be successfully addressed is 
that of funding. Aid distribution is uneven to countries experiencing violence and conflict 
(OECD 2015); for example, in 2013, US$626 of aid per capita was received in the West 
Bank and Gaza, and US$172 of aid per capita was received in Afghanistan, compared to 
US$35 of aid per capita in Democratic Republic of Congo (World Bank 2016). There is 
currently no framework for monitoring, tracking or targeting aid in fragile situations (OECD 
2015). Most donors are risk averse. There are rigorous legal and regulatory requirements 
that funders must conform to, in order to attempt to avoid any funds reaching terrorist or 
criminal groups, making many funders nervous of situations where fragility is likely (Lind 
2014). Further, donors have high value for money expectations, and expect funds to be 
spent efficiently and with considerable, measurable impact. Yet, the nature of violence 
reduction work is about political, social and institutional transformation over time. These 
transformations are complex and difficult by their very nature: change will be halting, and 
there is a real risk of failure. There needs to be changes to relationships, to the internal 
workings of structures and institutions, to perceptions and long-held cultural beliefs. The 
results will be quiet, negotiated, deliberate and will happen over time. The nature of changes 
that need to happen do not square with truncated aid funding cycles, or box-ticking 
monitoring and evaluation exercises. Donors must be more flexible and risk tolerant in fragile 
situations (OECD 2015). While there needs to be continued efforts to improve the tracing of 
aid funds in situations of violence, there will be many situations in which funds cannot be 
traced or accounted for. 
 
Unsurprisingly, given the political economies of violence-affected places and the difficulty of 
using external aid well in such contexts, more money is not always the solution. As seen in 
Afghanistan and Iraq (Suhrke 2011) as well as Darfur, Somalia and South Sudan (De Waal 
2015), large international support can create a type of rentier politics that contributes to 
institutional weakness and illegitimacy. These experiences show that modalities for 
delivering aid are equally important to consider, ensuring that assistance is provided in a 
conflict-sensitive way (Saferworld 2004). Pared-back international intervention, a longer 
timeframe, and the inclusion of militants and local opinion-makers in dialogue can result in a 
bigger impact. 
4.3  Towards peaceful societies 
Every situation of armed conflict and violence is different, and context specific. Contextual 
specificities of political economies, societies, cultures and histories have important 
implications for the development of policies to mitigate, reduce and prevent violence. Just 
because a particular intervention has worked in one setting, does not mean it will work in 
another. The challenge going forward will be how to support inclusive, endogenous 
processes that already exist. Although a consensus exists around the broad elements of an 
approach to armed violence reduction, these define long-term aims but are less instructive 
on practical approaches that can be taken in the short and medium terms. Further, there is 
no one-size-fits-all violence reduction method. Addressing violence is not as formulaic as 
25 
 
‘add legitimate/effective/accountable institutions and stir’. The optimal design of institutions is 
never an absolute. Rather, it changes in response to political conditions and trends, and 
framings of these by different stakeholders in places where violence is a way of life, a 
currency of politics. Further, what is legitimate is a matter of political and social positioning, 
and at different levels – what appears to be legitimate in the halls of the UN may look very 
different from a perch in the Office of the President in Juba, or likewise from the perspective 
of a community terrorised by the threat of violence in the South Sudan margins. What 
appears to be legitimate to ministerial planners, and promoted by elders seeking a greater 
hand in shaping rapid social and economic change, may be utterly discredited in the eyes of 
young people. 
 
Although there are greater insights into the dynamics of violence (its different forms, and 
how and why it persists), there is still considerable room to grow knowledge and 
understanding on the basis of the voices of different populations living with violence. 
Understandings of peace and security will vary between individuals, communities, regions, 
countries and organisations. Whose version of security and peace is strived towards will 
have a profound effect on the strategies and interventions employed to reduce violence. In 
order for violence reduction to be effective, the basis for intervention must be local 
understandings of peace and security in places where violence is happening (Luckham 
2015; Justino et al. 2012). This includes learning from pockets of peace, in places where 
local models of governance and community mobilisation have effectively prevented the 
infiltration of armed groups and militaries. Listening to voices in the interstices and at the 
margins is necessary to develop new ways of thinking and practice that can move beyond 
the confines of received wisdom and elite control. Getting there requires a new undertaking 
– along the lines of a Voices of the Poor-type analysis bringing together the experiences of 
women, men and children living with violence – to uncover new ideas of how violence can be 
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